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Given how much the tradition owes to Dewey’s pragmatic reconstruction of philosophy, that more is not written of a political bent by those working under the sign
of pragmatism is to me always surprising. John McGowan’s Pragmatist Politics is a
shining exception. The book’s aim is “to articulate and practice a liberal democratic
ethos inspired primarily by the American pragmatist tradition.”1 Two compelling
opening chapters lay out McGowan’s melioristic conception of pragmatism as a
philosophy of possibility animated by a belief in progress, drawing most heavily
from James and Dewey but ranging well beyond them, both within the pragmatist
tradition and outside it. Three subsequent chapters articulate “a vision of a possible liberal democracy” in the spirit of this philosophy of possibility and progress,
devoted, respectively, to the liberal democratic ethos itself, human rights, and an
alternative vision of that ethos as “secular comedy.” Most prominent in this vision is a Deweyan conception of democracy as “a moral idea” and a “way of life.”2
For McGowan, pragmatism is, at bottom, a philosophy of action and possibility. And it is by “reconfiguring what can be meant by ‘the possible’”3 that his
pragmatist politics generates its transformative, melioristic energy. When tied to a
“liberal democratic ethos,” cashed out primarily in Deweyan terms that emphasize
lived relations and communicative associations, McGowan’s “liberal democratic
pragmatics” is a countervailing force in the face of four existing threats that it is
well-placed to oppose: the expanding income and wealth inequality; the continued
growth of American imperialism; ever-present nativist fears and antipathy toward
non-English speaking immigrants; and the ill effects of globalization and changing
technologies. In the face of these and other challenges to the democratic ethos, pragmatists, in McGowan’s view, “strive to close the gap between the few and the demos.”4
McGowan’s is a capacious pragmatism that draws a common-sense realism from Peirce, James, and Dewey, at the same time that it learns from Rorty,
Putnam, and Cavell. Wittgenstein, Arendt, Nussbaum, and Latour (“the most
important contemporary descendant of the pragmatists”) occupy prominent places
as well. Those looking for ammunition to wage battle in the various internecine
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wars among classical, paleo-, neo-, and new pragmatists, thankfully, will find none
here. “Nothing significant,” he tells us, “hinges on whether what I say deserves the
name ‘pragmatist’ or not.”5 Yet it is nonetheless clear that pragmatist philosophy
is at the center of democratic action for McGowan. Most interesting is McGowan’s
use of Kenneth Burke, a figure—at least the pre-1940 Burke—whom he has argued
over the last decade is best understood as a pragmatist. Indeed, there is much in
Burke’s account that echoes and enriches Peirce’s semiotics, Dewey’s transactionalism, James’s emphasis on relations, and Mead’s account of interpretive activity.
Yet Burke also offers McGowan a framework for bringing these disparate elements
together in novel and productive ways—for instance, how Burke’s understanding
of literature as providing “equipments for living” suggests ways to bridge language
and experience.
Among the signal contributions of this book is the explicit, extended attention to a “qualified ‘reconstruction’ of the idea of the progress” that forms the second chapter. Highlighting the melioristic commitments behind the progressivism
of James, Dewey, and Addams, as well as the philosophical orientation informed
by “the positivist faith in science’s ability to improve human life” shared by Peirce,
James, and Dewey, McGowan sees a reconstruction of progress as essential to pragmatism’s ability to spirit us through current doldrums of “leftist quietism” by crafting animating visions of an alternative future.6 Importantly, this reconstruction
entails attending to the ways in which a standard of progress has justified colonial
and imperial projects of the past by offering “a metric to determine which lives are
‘more precious’ than others.”7 McGowan usefully reminds us that James and Dewey
already were enacting a reconstruction of the 19th century notion of progress they
inherited, with its Hegelian ontological guarantees. James and Dewey, on his view,
“refuse to believe progress is necessary or that human action is necessarily futile,”
but also “refuse to condemn or embrace modernity tout court.”8 For both, reversion is always possible. This chapter draws on and illuminates James and Dewey
on progress in familiar and fresh ways, intertwining it with their commitments to
pluralism. While perhaps not an issue for all readers, somewhat surprising is the
absence of attention to moral progress we find in Rorty, a figure on whom McGowan
elsewhere in the book is a reliable, non-polemical interpreter.
Paramount in McGowan’s pragmatist ethics and politics is the notion of “human responsiveness to others and to situations.”9 This conception of morality as
responsiveness, derived primarily from James and Dewey, translates for McGowan
into making “to what and to whom should I be responsible?” the most fundamental question of ethics.10 The liberal democratic ethos that McGowan expounds
eloquently and powerfully in Chapter 3 is defined by both our collective, cooperative responsibility to the world we inhabit and seek to create, and our individual
responsiveness to the concrete others with whom we share this world—a social
morality that nicely integrates Deweyan communication and deliberation with
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James’s attention to the “cries of the wounded.” This “liberal democratic pragmatics” promises not a “formula for reaching agreement on moral or political issues,”
but a “modus vivendi for coexisting peacefully with disagreements.”11
In its understated way, Pragmatist Politics offers one of the more developed statements of a pragmatist political theory that I have seen in some time,
providing not just a rehash of Deweyan and Rortyan theoretical oppositions but
a genuine, constructive forging ahead. Chapter 4’s account of a pragmatist conception of rights, which McGowan defines relationally as “the terms of our relationships with others and with the ways those terms are produced, articulated,
and enforced,”12 is a case in point. Drawing on Dewey and Rorty, though refreshingly not in a weighty, explicit way that risks being dragged down by polemical
baggage, as well as Hannah Arendt and Michael Ignatieff, whom he suggests
gives us “the most convincing arguments for a pragmatist approach to rights,”13
McGowan evinces a conception of rights as “claims” that “depend on an intersubjective recognition of their validity if those claims are to be satisfied, either
legally or more informally.”14 Informed by Deweyan insights regarding our social,
moral, and historical situatedness, McGowan understands rights dynamically,
as arising in actual interactions and negotiating actual relationships, attentive
to both individuals and groups. Here rights are “practices” created as “solutions
to problems that arise in human interactions.”15 On this account, rights are not
only performative but “educative,” in Dewey’s sense: “the struggles embodied in
human rights involve an effort to expand the relevant senses of membership beyond citizenship to every human being, and the continual effort to improve the
ways that people treat their neighbors.”16 McGowan’s focus is “not on what rights
are, but on what they can do.”17
The closing chapter, “Liberal Democracy as Secular Comedy,” is the book’s
most thought-provoking and ambitious. McGowan upends the familiar knock
on pragmatism for its failure to plumb the tragic depths of human existence
by presenting comedy as the quintessential pragmatist genre—and attitude. If
tragedy reveals the way things really are, as Nietzsche suggests, then comedy
imparts possibility. Comedy is “not metaphysical, but social”; it deals with selves
in relation to each other rather than isolated individuals, moves from situations
where fulfillment is blocked to its realization, celebrates change, and embraces
the ordinary. Here too McGowan’s orientation is recognizably Deweyan, though
he also takes cues from Bakhtin, Burke, and Cavell. Because the comic attitude
aims to produce a “’love of the world’ of the sort Hannah Arendt championed,”18
where love of the world entails “assuming responsibility for it,” it meshes well
with the liberal democratic ethos of responsiveness that forms the book’s center
of gravity. The comic attitude and vision are secular because our fate is always in
the making: “love and justice are only to be won by our own efforts; there are no
gods to hinder or aid us in that effort,”19 including in the face of mortality and
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death, where they repudiate sacrifice, as he illustrates through a supple reading
of Iris Murdoch’s Bruno’s Dream. Conspicuously absent here is any mention of
the tragicomic orientation of Cornel West. Given McGowan’s sharp bifurcation
of tragedy and comedy, an engagement with West’s perspective—specifically,
his view of comedy as not just about possibility but a way of acknowledging the
constraints on our freedom and “the incongruity between those high aspirations
and where one actually ends up”20 —would have been a valuable contribution to
this neglected strand of the pragmatist tradition.
The final chapter is also the most risky. Its music is rehearsed in a different
key than the earlier philosophical arguments. For some readers it may veer too far
from the score, striking chords, as it does, with Dante, Shakespeare, Austen, Auden,
and sounding popular culture references to Van Morrison and to films from It’s a
Wonderful Life to My Best Friend’s Wedding to Witness. In these moments, depending on one’s perspective, McGowan is either in a zone, riffing and free-wheeling
in an engaged pragmatist spirit, or the wheels have come off. For this reader, at
least, it plays, and plays resplendently. The turn to secular comedy represents for
McGowan a way to make political theory more pragmatist by “introducing issues
of sensibility, desire, and fellow feeling—and crucially, the on-the-ground living
out of our relations to others.”21 He explains that bringing secular comedy into a
discussion of liberal democracy “reconnects politics with desire in a way that more
sober political theory does not manage.”22
Given the book’s more pressing concerns, these moves also are an impassioned response to his background diagnosis of contemporary American society
and democracy and his sense that the liberal democratic ethos must find “an
idea that can inspire political action and an incentive for individuals to join
in the effort to achieve it.”23 That said, the book’s salutary political bent may
bend too far in the jeremiad we get in the book’s last dozen or so pages against
the decline of public morality, overpaid and unscrupulous CEOs, the growth
of economic inequality in the US, FEMA’s deficiencies in the wake of Hurricane Katrina, and the general sullying of politics as “our collective creation of
the world we want to inhabit together”24 —certainly issues, among many, that
deserve more attention from pragmatists. At the same time, for all the passion
evident in these pages, more analysis and concrete proposals may have served
the book’s overall aims better.
Nonetheless, this book has much to offer not only Deweyans, but pragmatists
of all stripes. Given his focus on meliorism and transformative action, McGowan
wisely seeks to steer clear of the “philosophical disputes that swirl around pragmatism,” aspiring to “metaphysical parsimony” in his account.25 Still, he is attuned to
the inevitable reminder from “philosophical police” that even his pared-down embrace of contingency and possibility over necessity constitutes a metaphysical position. Quite perceptively, he acknowledges his commitments and the baggage they
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bring, while insisting that pragmatism ought to resist, in a nice turn of phrase, the
“transcendental blackmail” of traditional philosophical arguments that amounts
to, “I am aiming to get you to accept that metaphysical vision in order to then argue that it has (inevitable, or at least reasonable) consequences for how you should
behave”26—a move that he observes both Dewey and Rorty sought to undermine
in their critiques of necessity. In McGowan’s view, the productive “meta” question
for pragmatists is, “What justifies the movement from a belief or a moral commitment to a new belief or commitment?”27
Among the many benefits of McGowan’s not pausing to parse the intramural debates among contemporary pragmatists is being able to push beyond
these entanglements to offer a meaningful and reasonable account with the potential to move the tradition forward. A good example is his brief engagement
with Robert Brandom, which yields “a dynamic understanding of everything
involved in the articulation of reasons” that assimilates Brandom’s “rationalist”
dimension of the conferral of conceptual content, Dewey’s social and cultural
contextualism, James’s relationality, and Rorty’s answerability to one’s peers, yet
without explicitly advertising it as such and setting off the alarms of any “philosophical police.” Contextualizing the game of giving and asking for reasons such
that one’s interlocutors are “real people . . . rooted in a place and a time” prompts
two levels of responsiveness to which pragmatists should attend: the first order
question of “What reasons—and how convincing are they—does this person articulate as underwriting her actions, beliefs, recommendations, and (ultimately)
ways of being in the world?”; and the second order questions, “To what specific
others does this person feel answerable? Whom does she think she should—even
must—address? To whom is she responsible?”28 With little fanfare, McGowan effectively integrates Brandom’s conception of deontic scorekeeping with Rorty’s
critique of its abstraction from particular audiences, and wraps it all in gleaming
Deweyan and Jamesian dress.29 An understanding of the articulation of reasons
which pulls the self out into relation with concrete others is an important contribution that I hope others will take up.
In sum, Pragmatist Politics not only is a rich statement of what pragmatism is;
its pages thoughtfully depict what pragmatism can become. “Liberal democracy,”
McGowan tells us, “has a story to tell.”30 This book seeks to inspire pragmatists to
start telling it, in ways that only they can.
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